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ABSTRACT  
Audit and financial reporting quality are under intense scrutiny nationally and globally.  
The outcome of high-level auditor-auditee discussion and negotiation issues (auditor-
client interactions) is central to this debate. Beattie et al. (2001) developed a grounded 
theory model of these interactions in the 1997 UK setting. This paper reports on a field 
study of 45 interactions in nine case companies in the radically changed post-SOX 
regulatory environment. Crucially, interviewees in each case company extend the chief 
financial officer - audit partner dyad to include the audit committee chair.  Fundamental 
revisions to the model emerge. The strongest influence on interactions has become the 
national enforcement regime, overlaid upon the international standard-setting regime.  
The outcome in both the eyes of the participants and in our evaluation is full compliance 
(contrary to the findings from the 1997 setting), regardless of the perceived quality of 
the standards and the integrity of the outcome. Personal and company characteristics, 
which were of most importance in 1997, have become peripheral. The audit committee 
chair is shown to fulfil a gatekeeping role in relation to the full audit committee. 
Keywords: auditor-client interaction; audit committee; audit committee chair; 
discussion; enforcement; financial reporting quality; IFRS; ISAs; negotiation.
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INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis has served to heighten concern regarding the performance of 
auditors and the quality of financial reporting generally (e.g. EC, 2011; House of Lords, 
2011, 2012). One key issue being debated is the need to establish a principles-based 
disclosure framework (EFRAG/ANC/FRC, 2012; IASB, 2013a; IIRC, 2013) to 
eliminate irrelevant disclosures and better organise disclosure. Another key debate 
concerns measures to enhance audit quality, including further extending the role of the 
audit committee (Competition Commission, 2013).  Additionally, the inherent quality of 
IFRS as a set of accounting standards is now being questioned in public discourse 
surrounding the banking crisis (Beattie et al., 2008a; House of Lords / House of 
Commons, 2013).  (To aid the reader, a full list of abbreviations used in the paper is 
provided in Appendix 1 and key terms are defined in Appendix 2.) 
Behavioural models of auditor-client interactions1, covering antecedents and 
consequences, have been developed and tested using both inductive and deductive 
approaches using a range of experimental, questionnaire and interview methods in 
several settings (principally the US, Canada and the UK).  For a recent review focussing 
on deductive approaches see Salterio (2012).2  The seminal qualitative study by Beattie, 
Fearnley & Brandt (2001) (hereafter BFB) was reported in a research book titled Behind 
Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About.3 A grounded theory model of the 
negotiation process was developed and findings were summarised in a paper in the 
International Journal of Auditing (Beattie et al., 2004).  This study contributed towards 
establishing audit negotiation and interaction as a clearly identifiable research area 
(Salterio, 2012, p. 235). 
In the decade following the collection of data for the original study, several radical changes 
occurred in the UK accounting, audit and governance environment. First, the mandatory 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the group accounts 
of all EU listed companies from 2005 resulted in a more technically complex accounting 
regime for listed companies. Second, the Auditing Practices Board was given 
responsibility for setting ethical standards for auditors and adopted International 
5Standards on Auditing (ISAs) amended for use in the UK (APB, 2004a) for 2005 year 
ends.  These are based on ISAs set by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) and include ISA 260 (APB, 2004b) which requires the 
auditor to engage with the client’s audit committee on audit and accounting related 
matters. Third, changes to the UK Corporate Governance Code (previously known as the 
Combined Code for Corporate Governance)4 required audit committees to engage with 
the audit and financial reporting process in a more formalised way. Under the comply or 
explain regime, if this requirement was not complied with, the company had to offer an 
explanation.  Finally, in terms of enforcement, the Financial Reporting Review Panel 
(FRRP)5, the UK’s financial reporting enforcement body, was given a new pro-active 
remit and a new body, the Audit Inspection Unit (AIU), was set up under the aegis of an 
expanded and reformed Financial Reporting Council (FRC), to inspect public interest 
audits and issue public reports on their findings.6 In summary, key changes likely to 
influence financial reporting and audit quality since Behind Closed Doors was published 
were the move to more rules-based and complex set of accounting standards (relative to 
UK GAAP), the enhanced engagement of the company’s audit committee and stronger 
monitoring of both audit quality and overall financial reporting quality. 
The impact of these changes on the behaviour of preparers and auditors was investigated 
in a follow-up field study by Beattie, Fearnley & Hines (2011). The parties interviewed 
included, for the first time, the audit committee chair (ACC) along with the audit 
engagement partner (AP) and the chief financial officer (CFO). This study therefore 
responded to Nelson and Tan’s (2005) call for research that recognises that practice has 
changed ‘to involve audit committees and various forms of regulatory oversight to a 
greater extent’. The research question is unchanged from the original field study and can 
be stated as follows: How do companies and their auditors resolve important financial 
reporting issues? 
Matched interviews were conducted with the CFOs, APs and ACCs of nine major UK 
listed companies who had recently engaged in significant discussions and negotiations.  
Interviewees were asked to ‘tell the story’ of these interactions.  The analytical 
procedures followed enable concepts to be identified and grouped into categories.  The 
interaction itself is the core category of the grounded theory analysis.  It is a process 
involving events, strategies, outcome and consequences. 
6The findings were published in a book titled Reaching Key Financial Reporting Decisions: 
How UK Directors and Auditors Interact (Beattie, Fearnley & Hines, 2011) (hereafter 
BFH).  The purpose of the present paper is to summarise the findings of that study, 
thereby making it accessible through the scholarly journal literature. Developments in 
the scholarly and professional literatures emerging subsequent to the book’s publication 
are incorporated in the paper and subsequent events and regulatory debates are 
discussed. 
It is shown that the process for reaching agreement on financial reporting outcomes has 
changed fundamentally under the revised UK regulatory framework, requiring 
substantial revision to the original grounded theory model. Our findings indicate that 
regulatory changes, especially the more stringent enforcement of both audit and 
accounting standards which is a feature of the UK context, have had a profound impact 
on the quality of interaction outcomes, reducing variability. These changes (enhanced 
scrutiny and stronger sanctions) apparently created incentives for the key players 
(including the firms’ technical departments) to comply with the accounting standards, 
irrespective of the perceived intrinsic quality of the accounting outcome. In evaluating 
individual outcomes under the analytical framework, we define ‘quality’ narrowly in 
terms of the applicable regulatory framework, without making any evaluation of that 
framework. In the case of compliance issues, quality may be equated to compliance.  
Where an outcome is a matter of judgment it is not always possible to evaluate the 
quality of the judgment, such as a discount rate, but it is possible to consider an outcome 
in terms of compliance with the process of reaching the judgment. However, in our 
broader discussion of the quality of outcomes in general, the broader intrinsic quality is 
considered, i.e. whether the outcome shows a true and fair view. This is an overriding 
provision in UK company law to ensure the integrity of financial statements. The 
application of the true and fair view under the changed regime in the UK remains the 
subject of controversy between investors and the FRC. In several interactions, there was 
evidence of a divergence between quality in terms of compliance and quality in terms of 
true and fair view. One CFO described the outcome from a particular interaction in the 
following terms, ‘It even got to what I regard as a rather silly situation with the auditors 
where they were agreeing that it didn’t make sense but that is what the accounting 
standard said and therefore that is what you have to do.’ Another CFO noted that 
7investors are challenging the sense of IFRS: ‘Most analysts use figures from…investor 
presentations…what happens in the statutory accounts is a side show’. Recently, the 
Local Authority Pension Fund Forum has confirmed the existence of substantial legal 
problems with IFRS (LAPFF, 2013). 
Findings from the UK setting will be of interest to an international audience for a 
number of reasons. First, the UK is a major capital market and many countries 
historically adopted UK accounting standards before moving to IFRS. Second, many 
aspects of the current UK setting are common to other countries (the adoption of 
international accounting and auditing standards and aspects of the corporate governance 
regime), suggesting that certain outcome consequences may be found in other settings. 
However each country offers a unique blend of national and supranational regulation, 
that influences the particular field logic of the time and hence the behaviour of 
individual actors. In considering reform, other jurisdictions can be informed by the 
consequences (desirable and undesirable) of particular regulatory mixes. Finally, this 
study provides a methodology for assessing the consequences of regulation and 
regulatory change that could be replicated in other settings. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  The next section, the literature 
review first sets out the changes to the UK regulatory environment since the first study 
was undertaken, before reviewing the relevant literature on audit interactions. Section 
three discusses the methods used in the study, section four presents the revised grounded 
theory model and compares this with the original model. A final section summarises and 
concludes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The UK regulatory environment 
The key changes in the UK regulatory environment that occurred between the two study 
periods, together with a comparison with the international setting are described in this 
sub-section. A summary is provided in Table 1. The UK regulatory environment 
remains fundamentally unchanged from 2007 to the present time although further 
changes are likely to take place. 7
8[Table 1 about here] 
International context and national structures 
Increasingly, national regulatory bodies are interconnected with supranational private 
sector regulatory bodies at the global level (i.e. the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and the International Audit and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) 
which functions under the aegis of the International Federation of Accountants IFAC), 
There are also governmental regulatory bodies at European Union (EU) level such as 
the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) which endorses IFRS as 
suitable for use in the EU (Cooper and Robson, 2006).   
This creation of a new institutional field and attendant shifts in regulatory logics are 
well documented by Suddaby et al. (2007; 2009).  In particular, supranational regulators 
and the global accounting firms have gained power at the expense of national regulators 
and the professional accountancy bodies, although national regulators and professional 
associations retain a significant role (Greenwood et al., 2002). In the US, the passing of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) following the Enron scandal introduced major 
regulatory changes in that country, which were substantially mirrored in many other 
countries (Lennox, 2009). These changes included, inter alia, independent inspection of 
listed company audits and a requirement for greater engagement with the auditors by the 
company audit committee.  
In the UK, responsibility for accounting, auditing and corporate governance regulation 
and oversight falls to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC).  Prior to the post-Enron 
reforms of 2004-5, the FRC’s role comprised responsibility for the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance and owning three boards (operating bodies), the Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB), the Financial  Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) and the Urgent 
Issues Task Force (UITF). The post-Enron reforms8 incorporated the Auditing Practices 
Board (APB) and a new body, the Professional Oversight Board (POB) into the FRC. 
The POB’s main roles were to inspect public interest audits, oversee the activities of the 
accountancy professional bodies and report publicly on these activities. The POB 
included the Audit Inspection Unit (AIU). Further reorganisation took place in 2012 
(FRC, 2013a).9
9Accounting standards and enforcement 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), promulgated by the IASB, were 
introduced into the EU for the group accounts of listed companies for accounting 
periods commencing on or after January 1 2005 (European Union, 2002).  Planned 
convergence of IFRS with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) was 
announced in 2002 (Financial Accounting Standards Board and International 
Accounting Standards Board, 2002), which encouraged the adoption of IFRS in many 
countries outside the EU.  Since then, convergence projects have been undertaken. Full 
convergence is no longer imminent. The IASB publicly attributes this to failing to agree 
fully on some projects (impairment and insurance contracts) (IASB, 2013b). 
Although IFRS are claimed to be more principles-based than US GAAP, BFH (pp. 254-
5) find that interviewees viewed IFRS as more rules-based than UK GAAP because it 
had been heavily influenced by US GAAP as a result of the IASB-US GAAP 
convergence plans.10   This is because the extensive implementation guidance in IFRS is 
argued to amount to de facto rules (Schipper, 2005). Thus, the role of professional 
judgment for accountants and auditors was diminished (Bennett et al., 2006).  
A key area of judgment that was affected related to the overriding requirement for 
accounts to give a true and fair view, which was introduced into UK legislation in 1947 
under the Companies Act. The concept has never been officially defined; indeed it is 
commonly argued that a definition would be unhelpful, as the principle is dynamic. In 
the 1970s, the concept was introduced into the fourth EU company law directive.  For 
useful general discussions of this concept, see Nobes (1993) and Walton (1997). The 
2002 Regulation (European Union, 2002) set out certain criteria for the adoption of 
IFRS standards.  One of these was that they should not be contrary to the principles set 
out in article 2(3) of Directive 78/660/EEC 11which established the circumstances in 
which the requirements of individual accounting standards should be overridden in the 
interest of providing a ‘true and fair view’.  However, the overriding UK principle of 
‘true and fair view’ was replaced by a ‘present fairly’ requirement in IFRS (Evans, 2003. 
and accounts which complied with IFRS were assumed to deliver a fair presentation. 
IAS 1, an accounting standard extant in 2005 when IFRS was introduced, refers to the 
exercise of an override only in ‘extremely rare circumstances’ (IAS 1, 2003), thereby 
strongly discouraging departure from IFRS.  Richards, an influential investor, 
10
challenged the risk to the override (Richards, 2005) and the ensuing concerns from 
others led to the 2006 Companies Act reinforcing its continued importance in Section 
393, but this was not applicable until 2009.  Interestingly, Livne & McNichols (2009) 
find that the use of the override has almost disappeared.   
The overall quality of the IFRS accounting model and specific standards have been 
criticised on the grounds of the unreliability of fair values and complexity (Penman, 
2007; Beattie et al., 2008a and 2009a; Bush, 2009; ICAEW, 2007). Following several 
years of debate, disclosure frameworks for the financial statement notes are being 
developed to reduce complexity (EFRAG/ANC/FRC, 2012; FASB, 2013; IASB, 2013a). 
Outside the financial statements, accounting narratives are an increasingly essential 
supplement and complement positioned at the front of the corporate annual report. 
Traditionally, narrative reporting in the UK has been mainly voluntary, governed by best 
practice guidance (ASB, 1993; 2003; 2006).  More recently, mandatory elements were 
introduced to comply with the 2003 EU Accounts Modernization Directive, extended in 
the Companies Act 2006 (section 417).  
The financial accounting enforcement body, the FRRP, first established in 1990, initially 
took a reactive role, investigating the accounts of companies drawn to its attention.  
Since 2004, there has been pro-active monitoring of the financial statements of public 
interest entities and directors’ reports have been included in this remit since 2006. Any 
concerns are raised with the company directors, who are encouraged to consult their 
auditors and their audit committee. Unsatisfactory explanations by the company require 
remedial action by the company in the form of a restatement of the financial statements 
(in which case the Panel may issue a press notice). Failure to comply can lead to court 
action, although the Panel has not yet had to take this action.  Research indicates that the 
FRRP’s activities encourage compliance, even prior to its more proactive role (Fearnley 
et al., 2002).  BFH (pp. 256-258) find that interviewees viewed the FRRP as keeping 
people ‘on their toes’ with an investigation being something ‘to be avoided’.  
Auditing standards and enforcement 
The Auditing Practices Board adopted International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) for 
2005 year ends.  ISAs are set by the IAASB under the aegis of IFAC. To ensure 
compliance with UK Company Law, these were slightly amended for use in the UK 
(APB, 2004a). The APB also has responsibility for setting ethical standards for auditors.  
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In a recent UK survey, Beattie et al. (2013) obtain views, from key parties involved in 
the co-constitution of audited annual reports, on the impact on audit quality of 36 
economic and regulatory factors.  Nine independent dimensions emerge, labelled 
economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; 
economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size; 
and, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection. Audit committee 
interactions with auditors were considered to be among the factors most enhancing audit 
quality, although many other aspects of the changed regime were considered largely 
process and compliance driven.  Audit partner rotation rules were viewed to have a 
negative impact.  
Audit firms which have more than ten public interest audits are subject to full scope AIU 
inspections.  The AIU reviews these major firms’ policies and procedures in a range of 
areas and also conducts individual audit reviews, which focus on the appropriateness of 
significant audit judgments and the sufficiency and appropriateness of audit evidence.  
The results of these inspections are published in the form of an overall report and reports 
on individual ‘major’ audit firms (e.g. AIU, 2012).12 In many countries outside the UK, 
similar systems of independent audit firm review and inspection have been introduced.  
Previous research into the audit regulatory space using neo-institutional theory as an 
interpretative lens is equivocal regarding the role and power of national regulators. 
Whereas Malsch and Gendron (2011) conclude that, in the Canadian setting, the large 
global accounting firms wield increasing power over regulatory bodies, Canning and 
O’Dwyer (2013) conclude, in the Irish setting, that national regulators retain significant 
influence over regulatory outcomes.  
Corporate governance 
A formal corporate governance framework was introduced in the UK in 1992 (Cadbury 
Report, 1992).  Subsequent reviews (Hampel Report, 1998; Smith Committee, 2003) 
resulted in the Combined Code for Corporate Governance (now renamed the UK 
Corporate Governance Code) and subsequent revisions to it (FRC, 1998; 2003; 2006a; 
2008a; 2010, 2012).  The Code operates on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.  The Code 
provisions relating to audit committees include the requirement to establish an audit 
12
committee (including necessary member attributes) and the committee’s role and 
responsibilities in relation to monitoring the integrity of the financial statements of the 
company.  These responsibilities were significantly extended following the Smith 
Committee (2003) and specifically referred to discussions with the external auditor. 
This crucial role of the audit committee in engagements between the company and the 
external auditor is set out in both the relevant auditing standard International Standard 
on Auditing (ISA) (UK and Ireland) 260 and in the provisions in the Combined Code 
(APB, 2004b; FRC, 2006b).13 Consequently, the existing dyadic model of auditor-client 
interactions was replaced with a triadic model including the ACC. The CFO takes 
executive responsibility for preparing the draft financial statements; the AP forms and 
expresses an opinion on these statements; and the ACC chairs the main board sub-
committee which has oversight responsibility in relation to the financial statements. 
In summary, therefore, in 2005 the UK, with its vitally important capital markets,  
effectively lost control of its accounting for listed company group accounts through the 
EU Regulation and voluntarily ceded significant control of its auditing standards to an 
international body controlled by the accounting profession. Thus the UK’s influence on 
accounting standard setting for listed companies and auditing standard setting for all 
companies became downgraded from setting and enforcing its own standards to 
attempting to influence two bodies with aspirations to be global standard setters. It did, 
however, retain control over the enforcement process.   
The move away from national standards was subject to some early criticism in the UK.  
In relation to IFRS, the chair of the Financial Reporting Committee of the UK’s top 
hundred finance directors, expressed concerns about (i) significant US influence on 
potentially global standards (ii) the use of fair value accounting and (iii) the risk of the 
UK losing the principle of stewardship (Lever, 2005). In relation to ISAs, Richards 
(2005) expressed concerns about (i) the overall quality of ISAs (ii) the potential 
downgrading of the true and fair view/override  in the UK and (iii) auditing becoming 
process driven under the prescriptive ISA regime.  
It was argued by some that trying to avoid diversity in standards across countries results 
in a rules-based, rather than principles-based approach (Hoogendoorn, 2006). 
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Compliance with such a rules-based approach was paramount in the minds of the 
standard-setters – in the IASC Annual Report (2007) the Chairman of the Trustees 
insists that a key objective for the Trustees is ‘to promote consistent adoption of global 
standards’ (p.5). This intolerance of divergence from accounting rules is illustrated in 
the Société Générale fraud case, where the company and the auditors were pilloried in 
the US press for using a true and fair override to book a loss ahead of what was 
permitted in IFRS (Norris, 2008; Accounting Onion, 2008).  The chair of IASB also 
emphasised the need for full compliance in evidence to the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee (2009, questions 202, 207, 209).  By 2008 and 2009, quantitative survey 
evidence from nearly 500 CFOs, APs and ACCs showed that the IFRS and the impact of 
IFRS on the true and fair view were deemed to be undermining financial reporting 
integrity (Beattie et al., 2008a, 2009a). In open-ended narrative comments regarding 
regulatory changes, only 24 of the 289 specific comments about IFRS were favourable, 
referring mainly to the benefits of global common standards. All groups complained that 
IFRS were rules-driven and overly complex, calling for a return to principles-based 
accounting and true and fair.   
Audit interaction research and the involvement of the audit committee post-SOX  
Audit interactions research is based upon generic analytical models of bargaining, 
negotiation and strategising (see BFB, pp. 43-46 for a summary). Behavioural models of 
the interaction process cover the antecedents and consequences of the interactions as 
well as the stages of the interaction process and the elements of the process. In a recent 
review of generic (i.e. not specific to the audit setting) negotiation research, it is 
concluded that hopes for a universal and simple theory of negotiation have not been 
fulfilled (Menkel-Meadow, 2009). While the basic elements such as tactics and outcome 
remain, ‘complexification’ has arisen from the consideration of, inter alia, number of 
parties, negotiator continuity, relationships, formal legal requirements, ethics, 
accountability, and discourse strategies.  The specific features of the audit setting that 
are likely to have a significant impact upon interactions are the highly regulated setting 
and the unobservability of the process and (frequently) the outcome.    
The vast majority of empirical audit interactions research takes the form of large-scale 
quantitative empirical studies, using archival, experimental or questionnaire research 
methods. For summaries of archival and experimental research see Nelson (2005) and 
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Salterio (2012), respectively.  While most experimental studies focus on the auditor-CFO 
dyad, a few recent studies explore the influence of audit committees on negotiation 
(Pomeroy, 2010; DeZoort et al., 2008). 
Experiential questionnaire studies elicit respondents’ experience of the incidence of 
interactions, the tactics employed and the outcomes. Respondents are APs (Beattie, et 
al., 2000 and 2008b in the UK; Gibbins et al., 2001 in Canada), CFOs (Beattie, et al., 
2000 and 2008b in the UK; Gibbins et al., 2005 and 2007 in Canada) and, most recently, 
ACCs (Beattie, et al., 2008b in the UK).  These studies have revealed substantial 
consistency in the responses of these groups. In the only study to date to cover the CFO / 
AP / ACC triad, Beattie et al. (2008b) survey a large sample of UK listed company 
CFOs, APs and ACCs about their recent experience of discussions and negotiations on 
35 financial statement issues (see Appendix 2 for definition of these terms).  498 usable 
responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%.  Respondents were asked 
to indicate which of the issues had been the subject of discussion and/or negotiation in 
the latest financial year. There was a high level of consensus across the three groups. On 
average, 11.3 discussion issues were reported and 1.7 negotiation issues. These 
interactions have a significant impact on the final published financial statements, with 
the accounting numbers being changed for 1.5 issues (on average) and the disclosures 
being changed for 2.4 issues (on average). The issues most frequently causing 
interactions related to business combinations, segmental reporting, deferred tax, 
presentation, the Business Review14, revenue recognition and exceptional items.15
Neither analytical models nor any one of these three empirical methods are, however, 
able to capture the richness and complexity of the interactions that has been revealed by 
grounded theory studies based on in-depth qualitative research such as BFB. In this 
ground-breaking study, BFB conduct matched interviews with the CFOs and APs of six 
major UK listed companies.  From this evidence, covering 24 distinct interaction issues, a 
grounded theory model was developed of the negotiation process and the factors that 
influence the nature of the outcome of interactions. The principal analytical categories in 
this model, arranged in five groups around the core category – the interaction itself, are 
shown in Figure 1.  The most distant group of influences was the global regulatory 
climate, followed by the external national trading and regulatory climate, general 
contextual factors, specific contextual factors and the interaction itself. General 
15
contextual factors comprised the quality of the primary relationship, company 
circumstances, audit firm characteristics and circumstances and the company buyer type.  
The specific interaction context covered, in particular, the substantive issue that was the 
subject of the interaction, the objectives of the parties, and the identity and role of key 
third parties.  Categories associated with the interaction itself were events, strategies, 
outcome and consequences.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
This approach has since been replicated in the 2001 Canadian context based on eight 
matched interviews (McCracken et al., 2008), with broadly similar results.  Some CFOs 
initiate a proactive relationship, where the CFO consults the audit partner as ‘expert 
advisor’ at an early stage to ensure high quality financial reporting.  Other CFOs took 
‘ownership’ of the financial statements, seeing the audit partner as a ‘police officer’.  In 
both cases, the parties worked together to find a resolution to the issue and the audit 
partner sought to ‘keep the client happy’.   
The interview study summarised in the present paper was conducted in the 2007 UK 
regulatory environment, and complements the limited extant large-sample research on 
the CFO / AP / ACC triad (Beattie et al., 2008b). Revisiting the approach of BFB in the 
context of the much changed 2007 / 2008 post-SOX UK regulatory framework, BFH 
(2011) report on nine UK listed company case studies covering entities of different size 
and employing different auditors and interviewing CFOs, ACCs and AP. Subsequently, 
this approach has been replicated in Malaysia by Salleh & Stewart (2012).  
Audit committee processes research 
Of additional relevance to this study are a number of interview studies which explore 
audit committee processes without looking specifically at the role of the committee in 
interactions.16  In a quantitative interview study regarding the actions and behaviour of 
audit committee members, Beasley et al. (2009) explore the audit committee oversight 
process in the post-SOX US setting by interviewing audit committee members, finding 
evidence of both substantive monitoring (consistent with agency theory) and ceremonial 
action (consistent with institutional theory and the earlier UK findings of Spira (1999)). 
Cohen et al. (2010) interview Big Four US audit managers and partners to explore their 
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experiences in interacting with management and audit committees.  Audit committees 
are believed to have become significantly more active and diligent, and to possess 
greater expertise and power, although they normally played a passive role in helping to 
resolve disputes (a finding consistent with Gendron & Bédard (2006) in Canada).  In a 
single case study set in the UK, Turley and Zaman (2007) find that the audit committee 
has a significant influence on power relations between key actors and is used as a threat, 
ally or arbiter in resolving issues and conflicts.  
In a review of studies of the relationship between audit committee characteristics and 
audit committee effectiveness, Bédard & Gendron (2010) conclude that audit committee 
existence, members’ independence and members’ competence all influence effectiveness 
positively, whereas the number of meetings and the size of the committee have no 
significant impact.  They lament the lack of research conducted outside the US, calling 
for research into the dynamics of audit committee processes. The review by Cohen et al. 
(2007) into auditor communications with the audit committee and main board concludes 
that communications between the auditor and the audit committee should include 
discussions of areas susceptible to earnings management and also factors that may drive 
management to make aggressive accounting choices. Interestingly, Beattie et al. (2012) 
report that individuals attend audit committee meetings as non-members – CFO (94%); 
CEO (75%); internal auditor (65%). Other frequent attendees included the company 
secretary, the financial controller; the head of risk; and the head of compliance. In some 
cases, other directors (including the chairman) also attended.  This suggests that complex 
group dynamics may be at work.
In summary, there have been major changes in the UK regulatory environment between 
1997 (the date when data for the BFB was collected) and 2007 (the date when data for 
the BFH study was collected). As summarised in Table 1, there was a shift from 
principles-based UK GAAP to relatively more rules-based IFRS, reducing the role of 
professional judgement in relation to accounting matters. Auditing standards also 
became more rules-based. The accounting and auditing enforcement bodies became 
more visibly active and the role of the audit committee was extended under the corporate 
governance code revisions. In depth, qualitative research undertaken in the 1997 UK 
regulatory context (the BFB study) indicated that general and specific contextual factors 
had more influence on the nature of interaction processes and outcomes than either 
national or global regulations. The BFH study examines whether this finding still holds 
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following major regulatory changes that includes the growing influence of the audit 
committee. 
METHODS 
Case selection and interview procedures 
The nine cases were identified from the Beattie et al. (2008b) questionnaire study.  As 
part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked if they were willing to be interviewed 
(39 CFOs, 78 APs and 33 ACCs agreed in principle).  Target companies were carefully 
chosen to reflect different sizes, industry sectors and audit firms, including all the Big 
Four firms and two other firms.  As data analysis progressed, these nine cases and their 
related interactions were judged to have resulted in theoretical saturation, hence no 
further cases were sought. The CFO or ACC from the target company who had agreed to 
be interviewed was approached personally and the case study project was explained, 
including our requirement to interview all three parties, and offering unconditional 
assurances of confidentiality.  To interview the AP we required explicit permission from 
the company interviewees.17 We obtained permission to approach the CFO, AP and 
ACC in nine companies.18  It was a very protracted process to obtain the access and 
permissions necessary to secure this set of matched interviews. 
All interviews were recorded (with permission) and subsequently transcribed.  The 
interviews were conducted with each individual separately apart for one company where 
the interview was joint with all three parties. In another case the ACC withdrew from the 
study at a late stage. We undertook to contact the interviewees when we had written up 
the results of the interviews to give them the opportunity to comment in order to ensure 
that the company could not be identified from the story.  All the interviews were jointly 
conducted by two of the principal researchers to ensure consistency of approach.  As 
well as being experienced academics in qualitative research, both researchers also had 
experience of auditing listed companies and were therefore conversant with the process 
and issues being discussed.  In preparation for each meeting, the company’s annual 
report for the period covered by the questionnaire was obtained and studied and recent 
press reports were also reviewed.  This enabled the researchers to become familiar with 
the nature of the company and activities, its approach to corporate governance and 
accounting issues that appeared to be significant.  Relevant questionnaire responses, 
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where available and where the respondent was identifiable (not the case for APs), were 
also reviewed to form an agenda for the interviews.   
As the issues arising in each case were different, there was no fixed series of interview 
questions.  Interviewees were asked to (i) describe how the relationship between the 
three parties and the audit committee worked in practice in their company (or client) and 
(ii) talk about the issues that had given rise to interactions (discussions or negotiations) 
with either of the other two parties and how they viewed the progress of the issue to its 
final resolution.  Not all interviewees from the same company commented on the same 
issues, however the interviewers gave no indication to the interviewees of what the 
others had said.  
The interviews employed both neutral, conversational prompts and a laddering 
technique.  This technique requires that the interviewer keeps asking for further 
clarification, working backwards to antecedent conditions and forwards to anticipated 
effects (Brown, 1992).  Examples of prompts used were: 
- Who first raised the issue? 
- What form did the discussions take? 
- Was the ACC involved? At what stage? 
- What role did the audit committee play? 
- Were any threats or promises made? 
- Were you happy with the outcome? 
- Did the outcome affect subsequent relations?  
Where appropriate, reference was made to the company’s annual report to obtain further 
assurance regarding the trustworthiness of the evidence collected (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Yin, 2008). No inconsistencies were found between the annual report and the 
interviews.  All the interviews were recorded and fully transcribed and lasted between 
one and three hours.  With the exception of two interviews, which were carried out in 
hired private office rooms at the ICAEW premises, all interviews were carried out at the 
client’s premises, wherever located.  The interviews were carried out between December 
2007 and April 2008.  However the interviews for each case company were held as close 
together as possible and companies were approached in succession.  
Analytical procedures 
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The approach to the analysis follows that adopted in Behind Closed Doors and Reaching 
Key Financial Reporting Decisions and is consistent with the grounded theory 
methodology of Corbin & Strauss (2008).  Grounded theory refers to the process of 
building theory inductively from the analysis of data.  The approach focuses on a core 
phenomenon or incident and seeks to understand it, by constantly comparing the data at 
different levels of abstraction.  This is undertaken by coding key features in each text and 
grouping these into concepts that apply across-cases.  Similar concepts are further grouped 
into categories and the relationships between these categories form the final grounded 
theory.19  In the type of grounded theory applied in the present study, researchers are 
permitted to be open to prior theory20 and the analytical procedures are well-defined.   
The interaction is the core phenomenon.  In exploring this phenomenon, theoretical 
sensitivity emerged primarily from our systematic review of the relevant theoretical 
literature.  This allowed us to maintain an awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data 
and suggested concepts and relationships that were assessed against the data collected.  
In addition, the rigorous procedures and techniques used in the analytical process, 
similar to those followed in BFB, were expressly designed to test and modify the 
grounded theory of BFB.  However, whereas the study by Beattie et al. (2001) was 
generating grounded theory, the study summarised here sought to test and if necessary 
modify that theory.  Grounded theories are evaluated in terms of their fit, relevance, 
workability and modifiability (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Therefore, the existing 
grounded theory concepts were systematically tested against the new data to establish 
which concepts still appeared to have influence and whether the influence had changed.  
We also sought to identify new concepts evident in the data, some of which may exist in 
the prior literature.  In examining and re-examining each interaction, causal conditions, 
context, intervening conditions, action strategies and consequences were sought (Kelle, 
2005). 
The analytical approach comprised four stages. First, the stories in each case were 
described. To do this, each printed interview transcript was coded using themes which 
emerged from repeated reading of the matched interviews from the existing grounded 
theory of BFB. The drafts of the stories were written up to include a brief overview of 
the companies followed by the interviewees’ descriptions of how the relationships 
between them and the audit committee worked in practice.  Thereafter, the main 
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interactions were written up individually as a chronological story reflecting the different 
perceptions of the interviewees who commented on the specific issues (Hansen & 
Kahnweiler, 1993).  Each interviewee in the case company was invited to comment on 
the draft story.  The interviewees’ reactions to the stories ranged from contentment for 
us tell it as it was, provided the company was not identifiable, to great sensitivity either 
about the relationships or the risk of identification.  In most cases where concern was 
expressed, modest rewriting satisfied the parties. However in one case the CFO and 
ACC did not want the detailed story to be included and in another no verbatim quotes 
were permitted. Interestingly, in both of these cases, the CEO or chairman of the 
company had intervened. 
The second analytical stage was to conduct within-case analysis using close reading 
methods based on the grounded theory developed in BFB.  This first required a 
classification system to be developed to allow common labels to be associated to the key 
concepts identified in each case. Descriptive concepts provide background information 
about the nature of the company’s activities, the role and function of the audit committee 
and the ACC and how the three interviewees viewed their roles in the governance 
process. The local contextual factors that might influence the nature and outcome of the 
interactions included the size of the company, the size of the audit firm, the quality of 
the relationships between the CFO, ACC and AP (graded poor to good), the attributes of 
the audit committee (e.g. number of members, other attendees, financial literacy of 
ACC, number of meetings per year, degree of contact outside the meetings) and the 
company reporting style, classified in terms of compliant/non-compliant and 
conservative/aggressive. The general contextual influences relate to the regulatory 
environment and the economic climate. 
Interactive concepts describing the discussions and negotiations which took place were 
labelled interactions. Interactions are classified according to their form (discussion or 
negotiation). The 45 financial reporting interactions were classified using the fivefold 
BFB scheme: recognition; measurement; classification; disclosure; and fundamental 
accounting principle. There were two possible decision types: compliance (where the 
regulatory framework prescribes how the issue should be treated) and judgment (where 
no prescriptive pronouncements can be made although a process for making the 
judgment was set out in the relevant accounting standards).  Interaction could be 
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characterised by a mixture of these decision types.  The results of the interactions were 
labelled outcomes The outcome of compliance issues were classified as compliant or 
non-compliant.  Judgment issues were evaluated in terms of compliance with the process 
of reaching the judgment.  
Using these labels, the local contextual factors that appeared to influence the nature and 
outcome of all the interactions in a case were first identified.  Thereafter, each
interaction was analysed separately, looking for local context, causal conditions, 
intervening conditions, tactics and strategies and consequences.  Based on close reading 
(and rereading) of each interaction story, we sought to identify the critical influences 
upon the outcome. Although this assessment is inevitably subjective, the extensive 
quotes given in the book from each of the three parties do support the judgements made.
This analysis allowed the fit of the existing grounded theory to each interaction to be 
assessed. Throughout, diagrams were used as an analytical aid to represent relationships 
between concepts and categories.  
The third stage of analysis comprised cross-case analysis. To begin this stage, the 
interaction attributes of each of the 45 interactions were summarised. That is, the 
frequency of each issue type, interaction type and decision type was noted. Thereafter a 
detailed tabulation of each interaction was constructed to show, in addition to the 
interaction attributes: nature of issue; interaction context, form of interaction and tactics 
adopted; involvement of ACC and full AC; and outcome attributes (quality and ease of 
agreement).   
Finally, testing and modification of the original theory was undertaken from the cross-
case analysis, drawing on the importance and role of each identified concept. 
Trustworthiness of interview evidence 
Two specific features of the study provide the reader with reassurance on the 
trustworthiness of the interview evidence (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). First, the study 
replicated the methods, questions and research team of the BFB study of ten years 
previous. The previous study did throw up many interactions where there was conflict 
and intense negotiation between the parties and can be viewed as a natural control – the 
only aspect of the research that has changed are aspects of the setting and hence the 
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nature of the behaviours. Second, these were matched interviews and the three parties 
separately offered three broadly consistent stories of the interactions. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section begins by outlining the general descriptive features of the set of financial 
reporting interactions discussed by participants and the general nature of the 
relationships between triad members and other key actors.  Thereafter, participants’ 
views of the regulatory setting are briefly summarised. The revised model of the 
interaction process and outcomes is then set out and compared with the original model.  
General descriptive features of interactions, AC(C) competences and relationships 
A total of 45 financial reporting interactions were identified across the nine case 
companies.21  Recognition/measurement issues (i.e. issues with both recognition and 
measurement aspects) and disclosure issues were the most frequent issue type (equal top 
rank), followed by measurement issues.  Together, these accounted for the majority 
(70%) of the financial reporting interactions.  The recognition/measurement category is 
split approximately equally between discussions and negotiations.  The disclosure issues 
were all discussion interactions.  A number of issues occurred in several cases: 
identification / valuation of intangible assets on acquisition (five cases), inventory 
valuation (four cases) and Business Review (five cases).  At the time the Business 
Review was an impending new legal requirement, therefore interactions involved the 
decision as to whether to adopt early and, if so, the content, tone and coherence with the 
financial statements. In terms of decision type, 69% of the decision types were 
judgments in terms of the accounting standards, 11% were pure compliance and the 
remaining 20% were a mixture. Compliance decisions were more likely to result in a 
negotiation interaction between key parties.  Notably, however, the overall frequency of 
negotiation was lower than in the BFB study. 
IFRSs are complex and many ACCs do not immediately have to hand the requisite 
technical accounting knowledge to understand the accounting issues that arise. Although 
one ACC interviewee believed that (s)he was up-to-date (‘I have been a FTSE 100 
finance director. I have stayed up to date.  I actually work quite hard staying up to 
date.’), this individual was in the minority. One ACC interviewee offered the following 
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view: ‘Most of us wouldn’t even pretend that we are up to speed with the latest 
international standards.  If the audit committee members are wasting time debating the 
finer principles you are probably off the track anyway.’ However these individuals 
appeared to recognise their limited knowledge and seek out the relevant knowledge 
when necessary – ‘if they don’t understand something, they will ask’ (Big Four AP). 
Since most ACCs have an accounting background, they are able to understand the 
subtleties of issues once they have the relevant knowledge and in a position to explain 
the issues to fellow AC members. One CFO remarked, ‘they are not accountants and 
they are not familiar with IFRS.  So my understanding is that they very much let [name 
of ACC] lead them on the technical issues’.  This situation has increased the extent to 
which non-accountant AC members rely on the ACC. 
Corporate governance changes relating to the role of the audit committee have 
transformed the predominant dynamic in financial reporting interactions from a dyad 
(CFO and AP) to a triad (inclusion of ACC).  One ACC interviewee described the 
relationships as follows: ‘in essence you are a thermometer which tests the temperature 
of the finance director in particular… I think the new triangular model, as opposed to 
the old binary model, where the audit committee comes to the party last, is definitely a 
vast improvement on how things were in the past’. ACC interviewees did not consider 
that either the ACC as an individual or the full audit committee should resolve disputes 
between the AP and the CFO.  An ACC explained this in the following terms: ‘The last 
thing the audit committee wants, even nowadays, is to be cast as arbiter.  It is one thing 
to be involved in the discussion, another to say I would do this.  They are poorly placed 
to make that kind of executive decision…    Most of us wouldn’t even pretend that we are 
up to speed with the latest international standards’.   
ACCs expected to be informed of emerging issues and for the CFO and AP to present an 
agreed proposal on accounting issues to the audit committee for them to challenge 
and/or approve.  Thus, there was regular communication outside the audit committee 
meeting between the ACC, the AP and the CFO and between the ACC and the audit 
committee.  This communication process was described by one ACC as follows: ‘I think 
that as audit committee chair I sit down with the finance director and with audit partner 
separately and I say ‘What problems do we have and what problems can you foresee?’ 
because they are the ones that we should tackle before we get there’. The ACC generally 
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played a key role in managing the relationships within the triad as they are in a powerful 
position and effectively oversee the CFO and AP. This finding contrasts with that of 
McCracken et al. (2008), who conclude in relation to the CFO-AP dyad in the Canadian 
setting that it is the AP who has responsibility for managing the relationship in order to 
keep the client happy.  
The evidence suggests that this new dynamic has changed the power relations among the 
key parties. In the previous dyadic relationship, power struggles could erupt between the 
CFO and AP (see BFB).  In the changed environment, both the CFO and AP are 
accountable to the ACC, who is responsible for managing the AC, which finally 
approves the financial statements before they go to the main board.  Additionally, the 
presence of other directors at audit committee meetings (Beattie et al., 2012) means that 
neither a CFO nor an AP would wish to expose an unresolved disagreement at these 
meetings, thereby risking loss of face and personal reputation damage.  Based on 
analysis of the interview evidence, these corporate governance changes, combined with 
the strength of the enforcement bodies, have caused the ACC (and audit committee) to 
gain power on accounting and auditing matters at the expense of the CFO and AP.  IFRS 
complexity has delivered more power into the hands of the technical departments of the 
audit firms.  This power shift towards technical departments was described by one CFO 
in the following terms: ‘But now there is a certain amount that the audit partner can 
agree himself, which I think in reality is pretty small, pretty routine stuff.  The big stuff, 
they immediately go to the technical department.   I would never have dreamt ten years 
ago of asking the audit partner if he had authority’. 
These findings support the findings of Cohen et al. (2008) and Gibbins et al. (2007) that 
audit committees play a passive role in dispute resolutions in the sense that resolution is 
sought before the matter comes to the audit committee’s attention.  However, neither 
Cohen et al. (2008) nor Gibbins et al. (2007) explore the role of the individual ACC, 
leaving a lacuna in our understanding of audit committee practices.  While Gibbins et al.
(2007), find that the CFO may not keep an AP informed of accounting issues at the 
decision making stage, because of feelings of ownership of the financial statements, the 
present study finds that the engagement of the ACC changes behaviour as both parties 
need to keep the ACC informed and the CFO no longer has sole ownership of the 
financial statements.  The role of the audit committee and the ACC as a mechanism to 
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control the relationship between the CFO and AP is also consistent with the findings of 
Beasley et al. (2009) who refer to a monitoring and a ceremonial role for the audit 
committee.  However the present study develops our understanding of this role in a 
significant way – while much of the monitoring is undertaken by the ACC the 
ceremonial role remains primarily with the audit committee. The findings also support 
Coffee’s analysis (2006) that the audit committee acts as a gatekeeper, although the 
present study extends this analysis by indicating that the ACC is also a gatekeeper for 
the audit committee (see also Beattie et al., 2014).  There are, in effect, two distinct 
‘gates’ or filters before issues are considered by the full board. 
Key parties’ perceptions of the regulatory environment 
Interviewees did not believe that the introduction of IFRS had improved the quality of 
UK financial reporting, due to excessive complexity, high disclosure volume and 
increased emphasis on rules rather than principles.  One AP commented on the 
complexity of IFRS as follows: ‘They have massively over complicated things to the 
extent that the number of people out there who really do think they understand a set of 
accounts is tiny.  Your average investor in the market wouldn’t have a clue’. Excessive 
disclosure volume was highlighted by one CFO as: ‘I think there are huge amounts of 
worthless disclosure that nobody ever reads.  I have never had a question from analysts 
on any of the detailed disclosures, so who is it for if it is not for the analysts?’. A typical 
comment on the rules-based nature of IFRS was: There are times I will get tripped up in 
IFRS because it is so rules-, not necessarily logic-based…You have to go through the 
volumes from cover to cover’. 
Some standards were considered to produce dysfunctional results and to require costly 
information collection that was subsequently ignored by users (e.g. the unreliability of 
fair values; the threat of a rules-based system to the true and fair view; and the 
requirement to recognise separate intangible elements in business combinations).  These 
detailed comments from interviewees are consistent with the views from the larger 
questionnaire study (reported in Beattie et al., 2008a and 2009a).  
Although ISAs were a less prominent feature of the cases, views were expressed that 
they, like IFRS, were overly detailed and prescriptive.  Some aspects of audit ethical 
standards were considered to be problematic. The five year rotation period for APs (the 
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period extant at the time of the study) was considered by many interviewees to be too 
short, potentially resulting in reduced audit quality (in line with the large-scale study 
findings of Beattie et al., 2013), especially in the case of large, complex companies 
where other key parties in the triad had also changed. An optimal rotation period must 
achieve balance between the need for an auditor to develop understanding of the 
business (which takes time) and the desire to avoid allowing time for an overly cosy 
relationship to develop. The restrictions on non-audit service provision presented some 
challenges, particularly for small cap companies with fewer accounting resources who 
were no longer able to obtain accounting and business advice from their auditor at a time 
when the complexity of IFRS greatly increased their need for advice and support (see 
Beattie et al., 2009b for further details). 
The FRRP was considered to be an effective financial reporting enforcement body and 
all key parties have strong incentives to comply with standards.  For example, one CFO 
questionnaire respondent commented, ‘I think everyone is running scared of a Financial 
Reporting Review Panel investigation... I have had experience of them …. and it is an 
unpleasant experience.’ The procedures of the AIU (the enforcement body for auditing 
standards) were considered to be process-driven and based on box-ticking; however, it 
was still considered a strong regulator and APs were most anxious to avoid adverse 
reports.  For example, one AP questionnaire respondent commented, ‘It is a much 
[more] effective review than the firm’s internal processes in my view.’  Further 
supporting quotes can be found in BFH, pp.256-8 for the FRRP and pp.262-264 for the 
AIU.  The fear of review and inspection was based on a mix of direct experience (for 
some interviewees) and perception (based on indirect experience within the firm, other 
anecdotal evidence and evidence formally in the public domain). Although the AIU 
appears to have reduced drastically the scope for bad audit, the nature of the procedures 
(i.e. the strong enforcement of compliance) may, in conjunction with other aspects of the 
regulatory framework (dysfunctional standards), have helped to reduce the scope for 
very high quality audit as well. As with the concept of quality in relation to interaction 
outcomes, there are two distinct notions of audit quality. The first, narrower concept 
equates quality with compliance with the applicable auditing standards and ethical 
standards for auditors. A broader notion of audit quality would step outside the 
(potentially imperfect) rules to consider inherent audit quality which might include, for 
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example, consideration of the auditor’s ability to offer advice and to ensure financial 
reporting outcomes which give a true and fair view.
Key parties viewed IFRS as complex and, in some cases, dysfunctional, while the 
accounting and audit enforcement bodies were viewed as being strong.  These 
perceptions conditioned the behaviour of the key parties when faced with financial 
reporting interactions. Despite reservations regarding the quality of some IFRS, the 
perception that non-compliance risked discovery and severe penalties engendered a 
compliance mind set. 
Process and outcomes 
Overview of revised interaction model 
The extended summary table of all 45 financial reporting interactions (BFH, Table 16.3, 
pp.284-303), which is described in the methods section above, underpinned the cross-
case analysis. (Table 2 includes selected features of this table.) A similar set of 
categories and category groups emerged during the analytical process to those identified 
by BFB.  The extent of influence of the category groups, together with the specific 
categories within each group had, however, changed very significantly.  Prior to 
discussing each category individually, it is helpful to present an overview of the theory 
in the form of a ‘conditional matrix’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Figure 2 represents the 
category groups as a series of embedded rectangles, with each group representing a set 
of conditional features acting upon the core category (the interaction). The interaction 
category group comprises four categories: events, strategies, outcome and consequences. 
The proximity of the category groups to the core interaction is of particular significance 
as this distance indicates the strength of influence on the interaction. The revised model 
comprised five main category groups: general company/audit firm context; specific 
interaction context; international regulatory regime; national regulatory regime; and the 
interaction itself.   
[Figure 2 about here] 
The categories impacting most directly on the core category of the interaction itself 
relate to the regulatory regime, both the standard-setting regime and the enforcement 
regime and for both accounting and auditing.  Whereas the accounting and auditing 
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standards are essentially international (the UK exerting only marginal control), the 
enforcement regimes, together with the corporate governance regime (particularly 
relating to the role of the audit committee), is specific to the UK (although similar 
elements are to be found in other countries due to international influences).  The field 
evidence indicates that it is the national enforcement regime which lies closest to the 
core category group, i.e. the interaction itself.  The pervasive and strongest aspect of the 
mindset of the triad members was a wish to comply with the extant standards and 
thereby not risk the consequences (both direct and indirect) of either FRRP or AIU 
adverse reports or corporate governance code violations. 
Each principal category in the revised model is now considered in detail, beginning with 
the most peripheral. 
General company/audit firm context  
The influence of this category on the nature and outcomes of interactions was extremely 
weak in the revised model.  The more complex three-way primary relationships placed 
pressure on all parties to ensure that the relationships work.  Audit partner rotation rules 
(maximum period of five years) also limit the length of these relationships. 
Consequently, personality and age-related concepts rarely featured as an interaction 
influence.  Additionally, all three key parties shared the same objective of compliance 
with the regulatory framework, such that professional integrity (levels of each party and 
alignment between the parties) was not perceptibly influential – compliance took 
priority in all cases. In other words, the key parties were prepared to accept what they 
viewed as a less than optimal outcome in terms of the true and fair view outcome, even 
if they felt uncomfortable with that outcome. The compliance culture that operated at the 
micro level on the mind-sets of the key individuals scaled up to the meso level of the 
organisation (both corporate and audit firm). Thus, company circumstances were hardly 
mentioned by interviewees, indicating a minimal impact on the interactions. Reporting 
style differences were not apparent. The company buyer type (a taxonomy introduced by 
Beattie & Fearnley, 1998) consistently in evidence across all cases was comfort-seekers, 
mixed with resource-seeker in the case of smaller companies with limited IFRS 
expertise.  The degree to which accounting support can be provided by the audit firm 
has, however, been considerably reduced by auditing ethical standards (APB, 2004c).  
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In relation to the audit firm, key support and monitoring infrastructure elements, such as 
second partner review; technical review and peer review, are now mandatory for audit 
firms. This reduces the extent of observed variation.  The professional integrity of the 
AP has become subsumed within the overarching compliance culture.  Personal 
integrity, viewed as behaviour extending beyond the standard required by professional 
ethics, was rarely evident, as it met with resistance and brought double jeopardy from 
the FRRP and the AIU.  APs wanted no engagement with regulators, and non-
compliance risked enforcement intervention, irrespective of whether the non-compliance 
was due to unethical behaviour or use of the true and fair view override. Consequently, 
all nine APs could be described as the ‘safe pair of hands’ AP type (BFB, pp. 275-6).  
No ‘crusaders’ were in evidence, though neither were ‘accommodators’ or ‘trusters’.   
Interaction context  
IFRS adoption introduced more complex process-driven judgments into a number of key 
interaction issues such as intangible valuations and share-based payments. In line with 
the general shared objective of the triad members, the primary goal for each issue to 
arise was to ensure regulatory compliance and thereby avoid trouble.  Secondary 
specific objectives of individuals in some cases included face-saving (when an 
investment was being reviewed for impairment). 
Prominent influential third parties were the technical departments of the audit firms 
(directly involved in at least ten of the interactions).  The audit committee was also 
frequently involved in the interaction, generally at the final stage when they formally 
‘reviewed’, ‘discussed’ or ‘considered’ proposed solutions and ‘approved’ these.  The 
audit committee had an active role in only three cases (twice being   used as a forum for 
resolving the issue and in one case initially arguing against the proposed treatment). In 
two cases the audit committee was merely ‘informed’ of the interaction outcome. 
Other directors were sometimes influential, either individually (usually the Chairman or 
CEO) or as a main board.  This involvement, which was typically indirect, stemmed 
from their anticipated reaction to reported outcomes.  Other company managers were 
drawn into a few specific issues, as were previous auditors, subsidiary company 
auditors, partner firm in another country, other audit firms and lawyers. Accounting 
practices in other companies occasionally offered a precedent – one CFO reflected that 
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‘I was quite annoyed. I felt that they were doing one thing for another client, why were 
they not doing it for us’.  CFOs in particular anticipated the reaction of analysts to the 
reported financial statements.   
Other specific contextual factors to have a significant influence in a small minority of 
cases were time pressure (two instances), the impact on future accounting periods (four 
instances) and poor communication by a key party (two instances). 
International regulatory regime 
In the face of the strong compliance objectives held by the key parties, the quality of the 
standards and regulations being enforced will be the dominant influence on the quality 
of the final outcomes.  Both the accounting standards (e.g. IFRS set by the IASB) and 
the auditing standards (ISAs effectively set by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board but amended for the UK by the APB) are set by international bodies.  
Both sets of standards are considered to be rather more detailed and rules-based than the 
UK standards they replaced and to preclude invocation of the true and fair view 
override.  Even where adherence to the accounting standard was deemed to produce 
dysfunctional financial reporting outcomes (i.e. misleading or not cost-beneficial) the 
compliance culture prevailed, resulting in a ‘silly situation’.  
The complexity of the standards impacted on the interactions, making APs more reliant 
on their technical departments for the interpretation of standards, creating a power shift 
within the firms from APs to technical departments. The complexity also made CFOs 
more reliant on auditors and made audit committees reliant on audit committee members 
with accountant expertise (usually the ACC).  The mean number of audit committee 
members reported to have an accounting qualification in Beattie et al.’s (2012) 
questionnaire study was 1.6; the mean number of audit committee members was 3.   
National regulatory regime 
The FRRP was viewed as an active financial reporting enforcement agency likely to 
identify non-compliance, significantly curtailing the appetite for negotiations.  The 
auditing enforcement agency (the AIU) was especially prominent in the mind-set of 
APs, since a poor review could adversely impact an individual’s career prospects.  The 
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activities of these enforcement bodies thus created a compliance mind-set and resulted in 
a process-driven approach to auditing and therefore reporting.  
Interactions (core category) 
Observed interaction events included: the provision of information justifying the 
accounting numbers proposed (frequently used to support judgments by the CFO and not 
normally challenged by AP); seeking of third party opinions (especially where there was 
a high degree of uncertainty involved); joint solution- seeking (particularly for complex 
and unique issues); and acknowledgment of a mistake (one instance). The joint solution-
seeking perspective was described by one ACC as follows: ‘We are a threesome 
working together, we have got a common objective which is truth and fairness and all 
the rest of it.  Some of the literature sort of talks as though you are spies on each other, 
trying to catch each other out.  I don’t believe that, I think we are there trying to help 
each other, trying to resolve problems before they get there’. 
In terms of strategies adopted, APs often stated their position firmly at the outset of an 
interaction for compliance issues, thereby adopting an assertive strategy involving the 
use of a direct and forceful approach.  The use of sanctions and threats as strategies were 
not generally used. Any decision to put the audit out to tender would require audit 
committee approval under the Combined Code.  The audit qualification threat was 
invoked in one issue when all other methods of communication had failed.  There was 
no evidence of ingratiation strategies being employed, however reason was routinely 
employed as a strategy (in particular, the use of evidence to support a reasoned 
argument).  There was no evidence of the reciprocity-based strategy (i.e. strategic give 
and take concessionary strategy) identified by Hatfield et al. (2008) and Sanchez et al.
(2007) in the US environment.  The ACC ensured that the audit committee was rarely in 
a position of arbiter. Both the CFO and the AP frequently appealed to a higher authority 
to confirm their position.  This higher authority was typically the audit firm’s technical 
department, but also included a specialist adviser engaged by the auditors, another audit 
firm consulted by the CFO and a precedent established by another reporting company. 
The interaction outcome quality is a dichotomous variable for compliance issues 
(matters of fact), but it is a continuous variable for matters of judgment. The ease of 
agreement outcome dimension (a continuous variable) captures issues such as: number 
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of parties involved, number of interaction stages, and use of strategies that undermine 
ongoing relationships. The consequences of interactions included the impact on ongoing 
accounting interactions, future accounting periods, audit fee negotiations or the quality 
of a primary relationship. 
The 45 financial reporting interactions clustered into six outcome groups. Interactions in 
the largest cluster (which captured 49% of all interactions) were both acceptable (in the 
narrow, compliance with regulation conception of financial reporting outcome quality) 
and easy to agree.  Valuations and impairments generally fell into this cluster (seven 
easy outcomes and two difficult outcomes). The typical pattern was that the AP would 
question the value proposed by the CFO, the CFO would undertake more work and 
present evidence and this would be accepted by the AP and the audit committee.  The 
primary consideration was whether the CFO effectively demonstrated that they had 
complied with the valuation process, given that it was very difficult to question their 
judgment based on a superior understanding of the business.  Due to the inherent 
uncertainty of the valuation, the assistance of an independent expert was sometimes 
sought.  In the Canadian context, Smith-Lacroix et al. (2012) conclude that the use of 
independent valuations in fair value accounting has crowded out the judgement 
exercised by auditors. Other interactions in this cluster commonly involved judgments 
relating to disclosures where IFRS provided little guidance (Business Review, segmental 
reporting and re-organisation costs). The tension often arose from the company’s wish to 
frame disclosure with investors’ reactions in mind. 
Two clusters each contained 16% of the interactions. One included outcomes that were 
compliant and easy to agree. The AP’s tactic was, typically, to state his position firmly 
at the outset, pointing to relatively clear rules in the accounting standards. In the context 
of strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, the APs used an assertiveness 
strategy in relation to the compliance issues. 
The other cluster containing 16% of the interactions included judgment outcomes that 
were acceptable, but attained with difficulty. The difficulties arose from the complex 
and unique nature of the transactions (little guidance offered by the regulatory 
framework), sensitivity (in relation to board members or commercial impact) and 
disagreement over preferred treatment.   
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The next largest cluster contained compliant outcomes which were attained with 
difficulty (11% of all interactions). Although the requirements of the relevant accounting 
standard were fairly clear for all of these issues, either the CFO or another individual in 
the company challenged the rationale and impact of that standard.  Two of the 
interactions related to the recognition and valuation of intangible assets on acquisition, 
two related to the treatment of financial instruments, and the other interaction involved 
share-based payments.  In individual interactions the basic disagreement was 
exacerbated by the perceived poor communications by the AP and by time pressure to 
obtain a resolution.  This served to protract the interaction.  The audit committee was the 
forum for resolution in two cases.  The compliant outcome can be attributed to the 
strength of the regulatory regime.   
Two clusters each contained 5% of the interactions. One of these included two 
interactions (from the same case company) where an acceptable judgment outcome was 
attained with slight difficulty. The relationships between the AP and both the CFO and 
ACC were not very good in this case – the AP challenged the CFO’s judgment with 
respect to a valuation. The CFO produced external evidence to support his valuation 
which was then accepted by the AP. 
The remaining small cluster of two contained interactions that were compliant outcomes 
attained with slight difficulty. Again, these arose from a single case company.  The 
interactions related to restatements to the previous year’s accounts. Both the CFO and 
the AP were newly appointed and so had no face-saving agenda. However the audit 
committee could have had such an agenda as they had approved the previous treatment.  
This lack of congruence in the objectives of the key parties created the slight difficulty. 
The most striking aspect of the entire set of 45 financial reporting outcomes was that 
none of them was considered non-compliant or unacceptable.  This finding stands in 
marked contrast with the findings of the Behind Closed Doors study, where there were a 
number of outcomes that were unacceptable due to non-compliance with the prevailing  
regulatory framework and/or dysfunctional. This confirms that the dominant influence 
on interaction outcomes was a generic influence, i.e. the regulatory environment 
(international and national) and, in particular, national regulatory enforcement.  Local 
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contextual factors (general and specific) have no discernible impact on ‘quality’ and 
only a minor impact on ease of agreement. 
Comparison with BFB 
It is apparent that, compared to the original model of BFB (see Figure 1), broadly the 
same category groups are represented. However new concepts have emerged, the 
significance of established concepts has changed and relationships have altered.  In 
particular, a comparison of Figure 1 with Figure 2 reveals the complete inversion of the 
relative influence of local contextual factors and regulatory factors. In Figure 1 the two 
outermost, peripheral categories (which have the weakest and most indirect influence on 
the interaction) capture the regulatory environment. The two categories closest to the 
core interaction capture local contextual factors. By contrast, local contextual factors are 
relegated to the periphery in Figure 2 and regulatory factors emerge as the dominant 
influence in the revised model. 
In relation to the tactics and strategies adopted, there has been a decrease in the range 
observed, partly because true negotiations have become more infrequent.  Only five of 
the eight generic strategies observed by BFB are found by BFH: assertiveness (AP 
stating their position firmly at the outset); sanction (audit qualification threat); reason 
(CFO or AP using evidence to support their argument); coalescing (ACC using the audit 
committee to secure agreement); and higher authority (usually an audit firm technical 
department).  In the prevailing culture of compliance there was no evidence of 
ingratiation, conditions being attached to acceptance or bargaining strategies such as the 
reciprocity-based bargaining strategy found in the US environment.  This latter finding 
is due to the strong UK enforcement regime, under which such reciprocity is likely to be 
identified by the inspection regime.  
A comparison of the boundaries of the observed two-dimensional outcome domain is 
found in each study is particularly revealing. A stylised visual representation is offered 
in Figure 3.  It is apparent that the overall size of the outcome domain has shrunk, 
especially in relation to the outcome quality dimension.  Thus, changes in the interaction 
environment appear to have reduced the variability of outcomes, especially outcome 
quality.   
[Figure 3 about here] 
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Provided this small variation is around a high average outcome quality, this 
homogenising effect is desirable. In support of this situation is the absence of non-
compliant/unacceptable outcomes in the later study (there were four such outcomes in 
BFB). However the negative side to this effect is that the ‘crusader’ AP type cannot 
thrive in the changed regulatory environment.  Such individuals find it difficult to ‘go 
beyond’ the accounting and auditing standards as they are written, due to the perceived 
loss of the true and fair view principle in the IFRS accounting model.  This finding 
supports the view that the more a system is rules-based, the higher the likelihood that 
professional judgment will be diminished in favour of compliance with rules (Bennett et 
al., 2006). Thus, while all outcomes were of high quality in the narrow sense of the 
concept, there was clear evidence that the parties did not view some outcomes as being 
of high quality in the broader sense which includes the true and fair view concept. 
Regulatory changes have slightly reduced the scope for very difficult outcomes. This is 
partly because the enhanced role of the audit committee has produced a fairly standard 
and generally simpler interaction ‘pattern’. The CFO and AP are expected to agree 
issues and present this agreed solution to the ACC.  More rules-based accounting 
standards have limited the scope for disagreement. This is coupled with the more 
rigorous enforcement regime which introduces substantive goal congruency 
(compliance). The triad then present the agreed solution to the audit committee which, in 
turn, presents it to the main board.  The scope for the involvement of other individual 
executive directors, a characteristic feature of difficult interactions in BFB, is effectively 
eliminated by the audit committee’s enhanced role.   
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The BFH study summarised in the present paper conducts face-to-face interviews with the 
CFOs, APs and ACCs of nine listed UK companies to investigate the interactions taking 
place as the financial reporting outcomes (numbers and disclosures) are agreed.  Across the 
nine cases, a total of 45 interactions are analysed in depth and the grounded theory 
developed by BFB is revised to reveal the impact of the changed regulatory setting. Many 
interaction issues related to IFRS standards which have introduced significant change, 
such as goodwill and intangibles, deferred taxation and presentation of primary 
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statements. One third of all interactions were classed as negotiations, however, intense 
negotiations (involving disagreement and conflict) appear to have become less frequent 
since the BFB study.   
The Enron scandal resulted in an intense period of re-regulation in many jurisdictions. 
There was a drive for transparency in the audit process and in financial reporting 
disclosure by the accounting profession and governments (Wade, 2007). Although 
accounting and auditing standard-setting is increasingly global (Cooper & Robson, 
2006; Humphrey et al., 2009), the BFH study highlights the importance of the 
nationally-operated enforcement regime in relation to financial reporting and auditing 
outcomes. This finding is consistent with the general view of Arnold and Sikka (2001) 
that nation states remain important players in the regulation of global business. 
Interviewees generally did not believe that the introduction of IFRS had improved the 
quality of UK financial reporting, due to excessive complexity, high disclosure volume 
and dysfunctional outcomes which did not reflect the substance of transactions in 
relation to the business.  IFRS was perceived as a rules-based system where compliance 
and box-ticking, along with process-driven judgments, have tended to replace judgments 
based on principles such as substance over form and the use, where necessary, of the 
true and fair view override.  The FRRP was considered an effective monitoring and 
enforcement body.  In relation to auditing, ISAs were viewed as being overly detailed 
and prescriptive, producing too much emphasis to formal documentation rather than 
audit judgment.  Similarly, the AIU was considered by many to be excessively 
concerned with detail, documentation and compliance at the expense of judgment.  
However, the AIU was considered a strong enforcement body and audit partners in 
receipt of an adverse AIU report could suffer damage to their career prospects. 
This changed UK regulatory environment led directly to: (i) changes in the key parties 
involved in interactions; (ii) changes to the objectives, roles and behaviours of these 
parties; and, consequently, (iii) changes to the interaction process and outcome 
attributes. The corporate governance changes relating to the role of the audit committee 
and the ACC have been largely responsible for shifting the predominant dynamic in 
financial reporting interactions from a dyad relationship between the CFO and the AP to 
a triad relationship where the ACC, as chair of main board sub-committee, has oversight 
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and monitoring responsibility for the integrity of the financial statements and 
responsibility for aspects of the auditor appointment and remuneration and conduct.  
Both the CFO and AP are accountable to the ACC, who manages the audit committee 
which, in turn, reports to the main board. These three key parties shared a general 
objective to comply with the rules and the processes underpinning judgments in 
standards in order to keep out of trouble with the regulatory enforcement bodies, to 
protect both their own reputation and position and that of the company.  ACCs (usually 
the most financially literate member of the AC) generally played a key role in managing 
the relationships within the triad and were engaged in the financial reporting process, 
acting as gatekeeper for the audit committee. CFOs and APs were keen to take an agreed 
position to the ACC so that there was no loss of face and damage to personal reputation.  
ACCs often informally took on the monitoring role that is formally assigned to the audit 
committee (informal processes were also identified in the UK by Turley and Zaman, 
2007). The ACC wished to be kept informed of developments on a ‘no surprises’ 
principle, leaving the audit committee to play a more ceremonial role at the end of an 
interaction, ‘reviewing’ or ‘approving’ proposed solutions. This is consistent with Spira 
(1999) and Beasley et al. (2009).  
These different behaviour patterns of the individual ACC compared to the full audit 
committee resonate with the findings of Gendron & Bédard (2006). Neither the ACC nor 
the audit committee was keen to act as arbiter. Interactions were typified by problem-
solving behaviours, rather than disagreement and confrontation, as all parties wanted to 
avoid being ‘caught’ by the stringent regulatory environment.  Auditors were primarily 
concerned with compliance where there are clear rules in IFRS and process where there 
are judgments associated with valuations.  The true and fair view principle was notably 
absent from the mind-set of auditors and other key parties (it simply did not feature in 
any of the interviews in the present study).  The general tenor of the interview evidence 
was that APs now regard professional judgment as something to be regulated and 
verified through inspection systems, consistent with the findings of Gendron & Bédard 
(2006) in the Canadian context.   
The interaction process was, compared to BFB, considerably less complex and less 
varied, as interactions had fewer events, fewer stages, and fewer parties involved.  In the 
revised grounded theory interaction model, local contextual factors (both micro and 
38
meso-level factors) were weak influences on the interaction. Features such as the quality 
of primary relationships, company circumstances, reporting style, audit partner type and 
company buyer type and personality differences, which had been an important influence 
have become peripheral.  In terms of company buyer types, the ACCs and CFOs were 
all comfort-seekers, with CFOs employed in smaller listed companies also being 
resource-seekers.  In terms of AP (seller) types – the ‘safe pair of hands’ has become 
standard.  The categories impacting most directly on the core category related to the 
macro regulatory regime, both the standard-setting regime and, closest to the core 
category, the enforcement regime.   
Certain negotiation strategies (e.g. ingratiation and reciprocity-based strategies) no 
longer featured in interactions, as these unacceptable strategies could have been exposed 
by the enforcement regime.  In matters of compliance, APs generally stated their 
position firmly at the outset (an assertiveness strategy).  The two commonly used 
strategies in matters of judgment were reason and appeal to a higher authority, 
specifically the audit firm technical department.  
The considerable range in the quality (in both the narrow and broad sense) of financial 
reporting outcomes observed by BFB was greatly reduced. All the compliance issues 
were classified as compliant and all judgment outcomes were classified as acceptable in 
terms of compliance with the process of reaching the judgment.  Quality (in the narrow 
sense) outcomes were achieved in all cases. However it was noted that some of the 
highest quality (in the broad sense) outcomes were no longer achievable as a 
consequence of the strong compliance culture and the loss of the true and fair view. The 
most significant influence on the quality of financial reporting was the regulatory 
framework.  The degree of judgment required has diminished under the changed 
regulatory framework; moreover the judgement of individual audit engagement partners 
has become ‘standardised’ by referral from the AP to the firm’s technical department, 
causing the influence of distinctive individual professional judgment to all but disappear.   
This power shift within the firms from APs to technical departments is consistent with 
the erosion of accounting jurisdiction that ensues from complexification identified in 
Smith-Lacroix et al. (2012). In their study, the shift towards fair value accounting has 
led to a concomitant shift in the exercise of expert valuation judgements from auditors to 
specialized valuers. These changes in the authority and levels of judgment exercised by 
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APs may be viewed in terms of the construction by firms of controllability boundaries 
(Gendron & Spira, 2009). 
Crucially, under an effective enforcement regime, it is the quality of the standards and 
regulations being enforced that will determine the quality of the final outcomes.  Our 
analysis indicates that the ease of outcome agreement was also strongly affected by the 
regulatory framework, in particular, the existence of accounting standards which are 
more rules-based and the enhanced role of the audit committee. As in the case of 
outcome quality, the impact was to reduce outcome variability.  Rules generally made 
agreement easier, as did the intervention of the non-executive audit committee directors 
in the relationships between the traditional dyad parties and the other executive 
directors.  
The BFH study summarised in the present paper offers important insights into the 
auditing and financial reporting outcomes that arise from the unique regulatory nexus 
formed by a de jure rules-based a set of (international) accounting standards; an 
apparently strong national financial reporting enforcement regime; and an apparently 
strong national auditing practices enforcement regime and a change in the role of the 
ACC.  The danger with a strongly enforced rules-based system is that it creates a 
compliance culture where participants, even if they are uncomfortable with the 
outcomes, engage in box-ticking and flawed accounting standards flow directly through 
to flawed financial reporting outcomes (a simple garbage in-garbage out model).22
These insights have relevance not only to regulators in the UK, but also to global 
regulatory bodies and regulators in other countries. The findings provide valuable 
evidence on the costs, benefits and unintended consequences of regulatory change in 
financial reporting and auditing regulation, thereby informing the intense current policy 
debate (Buijink 2006, Schipper 2010). It is argued that the shift towards more rules-
based regulation which is strongly enforced promotes a ‘rule-checking’ mentality – a 
mentality also noted by Ball (2009).   
More fundamentally, now that the US convergence project has stalled, consideration 
could be given to moving IFRS towards a more de facto principles-based set of 
standards. The interaction stories in our study revealed that the participants were arguing 
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about whether the accounting treatment complied with the rules or not, rather than 
whether it was the ‘right’ outcome. Moreover, the participants were generally aware of 
this distinction – they identified several specific IFRSs that they viewed as being flawed 
but felt compelled to comply with the standard. This awareness was because the 
participants were generally experienced individuals who were familiar with the previous 
UK system which had been predicated on the true and fair view concept. In the previous 
BFB study, the true and fair view was used as the most basic principle in several 
interactions. The loss of this principle was lamented by participants in the more recent 
BFH study – e.g. one ACC commented: ‘perhaps I’m old fashioned but, I do believe that 
truth and fairness is, should be, the overriding principle…it means that Enron can’t 
happen’ (BFH, p.254). 
The stability (i.e. transient or permanent nature) of the model of interactions presented 
here is unclear.  We are seeking to understand what is going on in a particular setting 
and so the ‘model’ is a general understanding with respect to that setting (time and 
place). The regulatory aspects of model are clearly subject to discontinuities that 
influence the particular field logic of the time and hence the behaviour of individual 
actors. It is, therefore, a dynamic model that requires periodic updating. Nevertheless, it 
is important to document and understand the consequences (desirable and undesirable; 
intended and unintended) of particular regulatory mixes. 
The BFH study summarised in this paper indicates that the changed system arises from 
the detailed nature of auditing and accounting standards themselves which are backed up 
with enhanced post-Enron enforcement.  The evidence suggests that the incentives and 
hence behaviour of key interaction participants have been affected in fundamental ways 
and reveals the dangers of a rules-based, compliance driven system. Although 
compliance and ease of resolution of interactions have improved, the outcomes have not 
necessarily improved in parallel – some have been a cause for concern and others have 
been economically damaging.23
Nine years after the first concerns were raised about whether the UK Companies Act’s 
true and fair view exists under IFRS, tensions continue between the FRC and other 
interested parties about the use of the true and fair view. The FRC has issued counsel’s 
opinions that IFRS adoption has not undermined the true and fair view (FRC, 2008b, 
FRC, 2011). However, the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF, 2013) 
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presented a second opinion to the UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
which gave a contrary view. This was then countered by a further opinion from the FRC 
(2013b).  The matter is not yet concluded.  
These early findings from evidence gathered in 2007-2008, before the banking crisis 
took hold presaged the devastating outcomes that can emerge from a garbage in-garbage 
out accounting and auditing regulatory model.  IAS 39 allowed banks, apparently 
legitimately, to overstate asset values by complying with the mark to market rule and the 
incurred loan loss provisioning regime. The Bank of England Financial Stability Report 
(2012, pp.19-20) indicated that, under this imprudent accounting regime, UK bank 
assets could be overstated by as much as £50bn.  
Subsequent Parliamentary Inquiries into the global financial crisis have highlighted loss 
of trust in audit and in financial reporting in the banking sector because there was no 
forewarning of the crisis. These reports have become well-publicised and hence widely 
recognised. The House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009) criticised the 
usefulness of auditors on the grounds that they followed the rules but missed the point 
(p.109).  The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee (2011) made similar 
criticisms (§198, p.51).  Debate and change designed to respond to the problems created 
is ongoing. Little change to the UK accounting, auditing and governance regime has 
been achieved to date, largely because the UK has limited control over the International 
Standards concerned. 
As a result of the banking crisis, the UK auditing profession and EU legislators are 
engaging in various initiatives in an effort to restore trust in the profession which is 
viewed by many as having been seriously undermined. A recent influential UK report on 
restoring trust in audit commissioned by the profession has alluded to the dangers of a 
garbage in-garbage out regulatory model. This report, written in partnership by the RSA 
(Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce) and 
AuditFutures (a thought-leadership partnership between ICAEW and the FRC-supported 
Finance Innovation Lab), observes that, ‘It is one thing to believe in the accuracy of a 
financial statement audit, but it is another thing to believe in its utility…Regulators 
review the ‘quality’ of audits on a regular basis, but little has been done to construct 
models of quality that take account of the outcomes for the audited business’ (pp.13-14). 
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The same report (p. 15) also criticises the profession for defending the criticism of the 
‘dog that didn’t bark’ during the financial crisis by stating that it followed the rules laid 
down for it. On the accounting front, the European Parliament is reported to be 
questioning the transparency and governance of the IASB (Armitstead, 2014).  
As part of the restoring trust initiative, the UK Audit Quality Forum, which meets 
quarterly, is currently debating the importance of reliability in accounts. In November 
2013, a leading investor (Audit Quality Forum, 2013) set out his expectations of 
accounting to restore trust. He believes financial reporting should be: true and fair; 
prudent; able to prevent management optimism; aimed at long term capital providers; 
support capital maintenance; report profits that are distributable to protect shareholders 
and creditors; and auditors should be sceptical. The achievement of this ‘ideal’ provides 
a significant challenge to regulators due to the highly political nature of accounting 
standard-setting (see, for example, Power, 2010).  
There is much to learn and research from this study. Whereas a compliance-driven 
accounting and auditing regulatory model produces less non compliance and outcomes 
which are easier to achieve, it does not protect investors and stakeholders in companies 
against defective standards unless there is an override. In circumstances where major 
regulatory change emanating from different sources (some domestic and some 
international) is introduced over a short period of time, the unintended consequences can 
have significant implications and the change process can take an unacceptably long time 
where the source of the regulation is international. The BFH revised grounded theory 
model identifies the risks inherent such a model which subsequently manifested 
themselves in the banking crisis and contributed to loss of trust in audit and the 
accounting profession more widely.  
Future researchers and regulators need to address what has appeared in the UK to be a 
toxic mix between domestic and international regulation and mechanisms for putting 
right in a timely manner failures inherent in a garbage in-garbage out model.  
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NOTES
1 Strictly, the ‘client’ is the company’s shareholders; a more appropriate term would be ‘auditor-auditee 
interactions’, however this term is seldom used in the literature.  
2 Such models are generalizable only within a particular time and country setting. 
3 The book went on to win the AAA Deloitte/Wildman Medal in 2007. 
4 As the UK Corporate Governance Code was known as the Combined Code for Corporate Governance at 
the time this study was carried out, we have used term Combined Code throughout. 
5 The FRRP has powers to apply to the court to force a company to restate its accounts if the directors 
refuse to do so voluntarily. 
6 The AIU was renamed the Audit Quality Review (AQR) team in 2012. For the purposes of this paper, 
we refer to the AQR team as the AIU throughout, as this was the name that applied at the time the data 
was collected. 
7 Neither the 2008 nor the 2010 revisions to the Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2008, 2010) materially 
changed the requirements for audit committees in relation to financial reporting in comparison with 2007. 
Changes introduced in the aftermath of the global financial crisis into the 2012 revision require companies 
(for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 October 2012) to include in a separate section of the 
annual report a description of ‘the significant issues that [the audit committee] considered in relation to the 
financial statements, and how these issues were addressed (FRC 2012, para. C.3.8).  
8 These reforms were introduced under UK law and through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
now the Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS)) 
9 Following the reform of the FRC, the Codes and Standards Committee takes responsibility for Audit and 
Assurance Council and Accounting Council, while the Monitoring Committee oversees the FRRP and the 
Audit Quality Review Team (formerly the AIU). For a description of the current FRC structure, see 
http://frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC/FRC-structure.aspx. We have no a priori reason to expect that these 
organisational changes would affect interaction behaviour. 
10 UK GAAP remains an option for other companies not covered by the Regulation, including subsidiaries 
of listed companies). 
11 Articles 2 (3-5) of directive 78/660/EEC state that: The annual accounts shall give a true and fair view 
of the company’s assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss.  Where the application of the 
provisions of this Directive would not be sufficient to give a true and fair view within the meaning of 
paragraph 3, additional information must be given.  Where in exceptional cases the application of a 
provision of this Directive is incompatible with the obligation laid down in paragraph 3, that provision 
must be departed from in order to give a true and fair view within the meaning of paragraph 3.  Any such 
departure must be disclosed in the notes on the accounts together with an explanation of the reasons for it 
and a statement of its effect on the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss.  The Member 
States may define the exceptional cases in question and lay down the relevant special rules. 
12 The ‘major’ audit firms are those that audit more than ten listed UK companies or major public interest 
entities. There are currently nine such firms, including the Big Four. These firms are subject to a review of 
selected individual audits as well as the firm’s policies and procedures. Compliance with the requirements 
of relevant standards and other aspects of the regulatory framework for auditing is assessed. For a detailed 
description, see http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Conduct/Audit-Quality-Review.aspx.  
13 ISAs became mandatory for all UK audits from December 2005 year ends onwards. 
14 Under the 2003 EU Accounts Modernization Directive, companies were required to produce a Business 
Review that disclosed information material to understanding the development, performance and position 
of the company, and the principal risks and uncertainties facing it. This narrative reporting regulation is 
comparable to the MD&A in the US, Canada and Australia. The term used by the IASB is Management 
Commentary. 
15 Financial instruments (IAS 39) generally featured just outside the top ten discussion and negotiation 
issues. 
16 Archival AC research studies treat AC processes as a black box. In a review of such studies, Carcello et 
al. (2011) conclude that ‘generally speaking, ‘good’ audit committee and board characteristics are 
associated with measures of ‘good’ accounting and auditing and with more effective internal controls’ 
(p.3).  
17 We also obtained permission from the heads of audit of the firms involved to interview their partners 
and disclose we had permission. Heads of audit were not told by us which partners or clients were 
involved and it was left to the individual partners to choose whether to disclose their involvement. 
18 In fact, no company refused access. In a tenth company we interviewed the ACC but he did not want the 
CFO contacted so the case was not developed further. 
19 For a detailed description of the analytical process, see Beattie et al. (2001, p.254). 
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20 Some leading qualitative researchers go so far as to view it as ‘impossible and illogical’ to ignore the 
prior literature (e.g. Suddaby, 2006, p.634). 
21 It is likely that the high level can be partly attributed to the (then) recent implementation of IFRS.   
22 The phrase ‘garbage in-garbage out’ is a programming term that refers to programming code that 
contains an error and consequently produces incorrect/unintended actions. When applied to a regulatory 
context, ‘garbage in’ refers to those aspects of the IFRS system that are viewed as somehow ‘wrong’, 
while ‘garbage out’ refers to the resultant dysfunctional outcomes under a regime of strong enforcement 
that engenders a compliance culture. 
23 An example of economic damage is identified in the Bank of England financial stability report (2012), 
whereby the requirements of IAS 39 in relation to loan loss provisioning led to banks overstating their 
asset values. 
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Appendix 1: List of abbreviations 
ACC  Audit Committee Chair 
AP  Audit Engagement Partner 
AIU  Audit Inspection Unit 
APB  Auditing Practices Board 
ASB  Accounting Standards Board 
BFB  Beattie, V.A., Fearnley, S. & Brandt, R. (2001), Behind Closed Doors: What Company 
Audit is Really About, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
BFH  Beattie, V. A., Fearnley, S. & Hines, T. (2011), Reaching Key Financial Reporting 
Decisions: How UK Directors and Auditors Interact, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CFO  Chief Financial Officer 
EFRAG European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
EU  European Union 
FASB  Financial Accounting Standards Board 
FRC  Financial Reporting Council 
FRRP  Financial Reporting Review Panel 
IAS  International Accounting Standard 
IAASB International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board  
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
IFAC  International Federation of Accountants 
IFRS  International Financial Reporting Standard 
IIRC  International Integrated Reporting Council 
ISA  International Standard on Auditing 
POB  Public Oversight Board 
SOX  Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
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Appendix 2: Definition of key terms 
Discussion: matters raised by one or more participants and considered in speech or writing 
Negotiation: the process of reconciling conflicting views advanced in discussion, by concessions by 
one, two or all participants 
Judgment decision: where no rule exists, e.g. valuation decisions 
Compliance decision: where a clear rule exists  
Company buyer types: a taxonomy inductively derived by Beattie & Fearnley (1998) comprising: 
Comfort-seekers: sees significant value in audit and wants assurance that controls are operating 
effectively and the financial statements are of high quality 
Resource-seekers: sees significant value in audit, wants technical financial reporting advice, 
business ideas and non-audit services (types of advice and service no longer permitted under 
ethical standards for auditors) 
Status-seekers: see little value in audit but wishes to gain credibility and reputation by associating 
with an audit firm of high status 
Grudgers: see little value in audit and seeks to minimise audit fee 
Audit partner seller types: a taxonomy inductively derived by Beattie et al. (2001) comprising: 
Crusader: has extremely high professional and personal integrity and is fully prepared to escalate 
an issue 
Safe hands: exhibits high professional integrity, identifies closely with the client and, and is 
prepared to escalate an issue 
Accommodator: has moderate professional integrity and will knowingly bend the rules under 
pressure 
Truster: has moderate professional integrity and may, unknowingly, permit rules to be bent 
because (s)he is not sufficiently sceptical   
Quality of outcome: In evaluating individual outcomes, ‘quality’ is defined narrowly in terms of the 
applicable regulatory framework, without making any evaluation of that framework. In the case of 
compliance issues, quality may be equated to compliance.  Where an outcome is a matter of 
judgment it is not possible to evaluate the quality of the judgment but is it is possible to consider it 
in terms of compliance with the process of reaching the judgment. In evaluating outcomes in 
general, however, the broader intrinsic quality is considered, i.e. whether the outcome shows a 
true and fair view. This is an overriding provision in UK company law to ensure the integrity of 
financial statements. 
Ease of agreement: captures issues such as: number of parties involved, number of interaction stages, 
and use of strategies that undermine ongoing relationships. 
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Table 1: Summary of UK Regulatory Changes – 1997 to 2007 
Regulation 1997 2007 Comment 
Applicable accounting 
standards for group 
accounts of listed 
companies 
UK GAAP IFRS More rules-based 
Overriding principle True and fair view Present fairly in 
accordance with 
applicable accounting 
framework 
Reduction in 
professional 
judgment 
Financial Accounting 
enforcement body 
FRRP FRRP Becomes proactive 
Auditing standards UK auditing standards ISAs (UK & Ireland) More rules-based 
Auditing enforcement 
body 
Peer review by 
professional body 
AIU Independent review; 
results made public 
Corporate governance 
code 
1996 Combined Code 2006 Combined Code Role of AC 
extended; 
communication 
between AC and 
external auditor 
extended 
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Table 2: Descriptive data and analysis of nine case companies and 45 interactions 
Case 
company 
ID 
Company 
size/audit 
firm type 
Interaction issue Interaction attributes Outcome attributes 
Interaction 
type 
Issue type1 Decision type Quality of 
outcome 
Ease of 
agreement 
S Large/B4 1. Audit fees 
2. Cost treatment 
3. Re-organization costs 
4. Inventory provisions 
5. Dividends from subs 
6. Pension liabilities 
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Negotiation 
Audit 
Measurement 
Classification 
Measurement 
Classification 
Measurement 
n/a 
Compliance/judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Compliance 
Judgement 
n/a 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Compliant 
Acceptable 
Difficult 
Difficult 
Difficult 
Slightly difficult 
Easy 
Slightly difficult 
K Large/B4 1. Intangibles val’n 
2. Impairment reviews 
3. Fin’l instruments – 
pref.shares 
4 Fin’l instruments – hedging 
5. Re-organisation costs  
6. Fraud and illegal acts  
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Meas’t/Disc 
Classification 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Classification 
Audit 
Compliance/judgement 
Judgement 
Compliance 
Compliance/judgement 
Judgement 
n/a 
Compliant 
Acceptable 
Compliant 
Compliant 
Acceptable 
n/a 
Difficult 
Difficult 
Difficult 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
M Large/B4 1. Audit fee 
2. Complex transaction 
3. Business Review  
4. Fin’ instruments – hedging 
5. Going concern  
6. Impairment of assets
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Audit 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Disclosure 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Fund’l principle 
Measurement 
n/a 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Compliance/judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
n/a 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Compliant 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Difficult 
Difficult 
Easy 
Difficult 
Easy 
Easy 
F Small/B4 1. Audit fees post tender  
2. Notional interest treatment 
3. Earnings per share  
4. Share based payments 
5. Treatment of tax credits  
6. Revenue recognition  
7. Intangibles val’n 
8. Segmental reporting  
9. Business Review  
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Audit 
Meas’t/Disc 
Disclosure 
Recognition 
Meas’t/Disc 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Disclosure 
Disclosure 
n/a 
Compliance/judgement 
Compliance 
Compliance 
Compliance 
Judgement 
Compliance/judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
n/a 
Compliant 
Compliant 
Compliant 
Compliant 
Gen. acceptable 
Compliant 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Slightly difficult 
Slightly difficult 
Easy 
Difficult 
Slightly difficult 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
C Small/non
-B4 
1. Identification of 
intangibles on acq’n  
Discussion Recog’n/Meas’t Compliance/judgement Compliant Easy 
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2. Impairment of goodwill  
3. Deferred tax asset  
4. Provision on inventories  
5. Business Review  
6. Misreporting in subsidiary 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Measurement 
Measurement 
Measurement 
Disclosure 
Meas’t/Corp.Gov 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
P Large/B4 1. Presentation of cash flow 
statement 
2. Inventory valuation  
3. Contingent liabilities 
4. FV of lease on acq’n  
5. Re-organisation costs  
6. Segmental reporting 
7. Control weakness 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Classification 
Measurement 
Disclosure 
Measurement 
Classification 
Disclosure 
Corp. Gov./Disc. 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Difficult 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
W Small/B4 1. Inventory valuation  
2. Breach of internal controls 
3. Intangibles valuation
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Measurement 
Corp. gov. 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Judgement 
n/a 
Compliance/judgement 
Acceptable 
Not best 
practice 
Compliant 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
R Large/B4 1. Complex transaction 
2. Disclosures re potential 
future losses 
3. Business Review 
Negotiation 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Recog’n/Meas’t/ 
Disc. 
Disclosure 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Difficult 
Difficult 
Easy 
O Small/not 
disclosed 
1. Identification of 
intangibles on acq’n  
2. Share-based payments 
3. Business Review 
4. Segmental reporting 
Negotiation 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Discussion 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Recog’n/Meas’t 
Disclosure 
Disclosure 
Compliance/judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Judgement 
Compliant 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
Difficult 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Note to table: 
1. Issue types were classified using the BFB scheme: recognition; measurement; classification; disclosure; and fundamental accounting principle. 
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Global regulatory climate 
 SEC 
 EC 
External national climate 
 External trading 
      environment 
 Regulatory climate 
General company/audit firm context 
 Quality of primary relationship 
 Company circumstances 
 Firm circumstances 
 Company buyer type 
Figure 1: The grounded theory model of Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (2001) 
Source: Figure 12.1 in Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is 
Really About, 2001, Palgrave, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
Specific context 
 Issue 
 Objectives 
 Key third parties 
 Other 
Interaction 
(core category) 
 Events 
 Strategies 
 Outcome 
 Consequences 
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General company/audit firm context  
Interaction context
International  
regulatory 
regime – standard 
-setting 
 Accounting 
o IFRS1
 Auditing 
o ISAs2
Figure 2: Principal analytical categories in the revised grounded theory of financial 
reporting interactions 
Notes to table: 
1. IFRS are issued by the IASB. 
2. ISAs are issued by the IAASB, with minor changes to adapt for the UK environment. 
3. The UK national governance code is issued by the FRC, and compliance (on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis) is a stock exchange listing requirement. Enforcement is therefore market-based. 
Source: Figure 16.1 (p.283) in Beattie, Fearnley and Hines, Reaching Key Financial Reporting 
Decisions: How Directors and Auditors Interact, 2011, Wiley, reproduced with permission 
of Wiley.
National regulatory regime  
 Enforcement
o Accounting  
 FRRP 
o Auditing  
 AIU 
 Standard / guideline setting 
o Corporate governance, particularly 
role of role of audit committees 3
o Auditors’ Ethical Standards 
Interaction 
(core category) 
 Events 
 Strategies 
 Outcome: 
o Quality 
o Ease of agreement 
 Consequences 
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Figure 3: The shrinking interaction outcome domain between 1997 and 2007 
Source: Figure 16.5 (p.320) in Beattie, Fearnley and Hines, Reaching Key Financial Reporting 
Decisions: How Directors and Auditors Interact, 2011, Wiley, reproduced with permission 
of Wiley.
This shaded oblong represents the  
smaller domain of outcomes in 2007/8 
which has been restricted by IFRS and 
the enforcement regime.  
This large oblong represents the domain of 
observed outcomes in 1997 prior to the regulatory 
changes from 2003 onwards. The gap at the top 
represents the loss of the true and fair view override 
and the principle of substance over form and 
prudence.  The arrows represent regulatory pressure
reducing the size of the domain. 
Quality of outcome 
Compliant /Acceptable 
Ease of 
agreement 
Easy 
Quality of outcome 
Non-compliant /Unacceptable 
Ease of 
agreement 
Difficult 
